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Young people in the Arab world increas-
ingly have to struggle with economic 
hardship and difficulties to start their own 
lives, although the majority is better edu-
cated than ever before. The problematic 
labor market situation combined with 
weak public schemes to support young 
careers force large sections of young peo-
ple to postpone their ambitions to marry. 
This period of delayed marriage is cap-
tured as ‘waithood’. I will argue that this 
term is misleading. Two points of critique 
apply: The social dimension of waiting 
exceeds the status of remaining inactive 
until something expected happens; the 
ever-changing present continuously gen-
erates new realities. Simultaneously 
uncertainties and insecurities have dra-
matically expanded since 2011 and fur-
ther limit livelihood opportunities and 
future perspectives, particularly of the 
youth. Young people are hence becoming 
both, increasingly frustrated and disad-
vantaged the longer they “wait”, and 
even more dependent on parents and kin 
networks. This hinders them to develop 
their personality – they rather have to 
accommodate with values that are not 
always suitable to master the present 
requirements of a globalizing world. In 
this paper I will inquire, in how far young 
people of the Arab world have thus to be 
considered as a “contained youth”.
Keywords: youth, waithood, contained 
youth
Introduction
Alongside progressing industrialization 
and modernization, youth has emerged as 
a social group. Originally being a mere rite 
de passage between childhood and adult-
hood, adolescence has become a more or 
less fixed period, both delineated and 
fragmented by various transitions, such as 
from completing education to starting 
work, from living together with parents to 
moving into independent housing, and 
from being single to finding a partner to 
marry and take over responsibility for oth-
ers. More recently, the time of adoles-
cence has been further extended in Arab 
countries (but not only there), as marriage 
increasingly is postponed. Diane 
Singerman (7) captures this phenomenon 
as ‘waithood’, emphasising that delayed 
marriage has become the norm, mainly for 
economic reasons. I will argue that the 
term ‘waithood’ is no longer able to cap-
ture the deep social transformations the 
current generation of Arab youth are 
experiencing. ‘Waiting’ more generally 
suggests that after a period of delay things 
will go on; it connotes a status of remain-
ing inactive or of being in a state of repose 
until something expected happens. This is 
misleading, as the ever-changing present 
continuously generates new realities. 
Moreover, the current situation is particu-






Middle East – Topics & Arguments #09–2017
26
points are crucial: (1) After decades of neo-
liberal restructuring, including the world 
financial crisis (2007/8), and after the so-
called Arab Spring (2010/11), widespread 
insecurity and uncertainty prevail in most 
Arab countries. Severe economic prob-
lems, political instability, war, and complex 
emergencies have dramatically reduced 
public transfers, while voluntary institu-
tions offering social support have also 
been weakened, with severe repercus-
sions. (2) Dependency on parents, kin and 
social networks are ever more increasing. 
Insecurities and status transitions of young 
people have almost entirely been buff-
ered by family help and solidarity. (3) 
Liberation from family bonds thus 
becomes almost impossible, a break with 
parents often unthinkable. Young people 
have to accommodate themselves with 
the rules and moralities of their parents; a 
large section has hence to be considered 
a ‘contained youth’ – one that is enclosed 
and embedded in family configurations. 
The consequences are far-reaching: frus-
tration about problematic economic pros-
pects, sublimation of sexual desires, and 
half-hearted alignments with adult values 
all constrain juvenile identity formation. If 
the questioning of social norms and of 
established thinking is not disentangled 
and somehow released from kinship ties 
and innovation are not empowered dur-
ing adolescence, the renewal and regen-
eration of society is endangered; out-
dated value-sets are artificially prolonged. 
Under the global condition—where no one 
is any longer outside of far-stretching 
articulations and rather part of global 
competition—this does not qualify as a 
solid position from which to master the 
future. My argument in this essay unfolds 
in three steps: I inquire about the relations 
between youth and society, revisit the 
properties of waithood, and discuss the 
characteristics of a contained youth.
Youth and Society 
Youth, of course, is just a word (Bourdieu). 
But what does it represent? A short rite of 
passage, a period between childhood and 
adulthood, a status of not yet being mar-
ried, or rather a still uncompleted achieve-
ment of not being a father or mother? 
With on-going processes of globalization 
and financialization, the notion of youth 
has changed during the last decades 
within and between societies. Three rather 
rhetorical questions open up the context: 
How did Arab society change more 
recently, how is the concept of family 
related to these transformations, and how 
did youth emerge as a social category rep-
resenting specific segments of recent 
Arab societies? To address these ques-
tions I will juxtapose some key criteria 
from the Arab world with some insights 
from German youth studies and inquire 
about the (changing) properties of youth 
within different societies. This is not to say 
that Arab or European societies, such as 
the ‘German,’ contain only one type of 
youth, one type of family or one coherent 
society. Obviously, the following state-
ments will entail great generalizations. It is 
thus neither a search for singularity nor for 
uniformity, but rather an attempt to create 
abstract positions that open up a spec-
trum of possibilities to capture different 
notions of youth.
Elizabeth Warnock Fernea reflects on the 
shifting notions of childhood in the Middle 
East. She explains: 
In the predominately agrarian societies 
in the past, the primary social unit in 
the Middle East was the extended fa-
mily, which might range in size from 20 
to 200 persons, related on both sides 
of the marital connection. Within this 
kin group, each child received identity, 
affection, discipline, role models, and 
economic and social support, ideally 
from birth to death; in exchange the 
family required conformity and loyalty 
from all members, beginning in early 
childhood. The crucial test of allegi-
ance came with the time of marriage, 
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when the man or woman either acce-
ded to or rebelled against the wishes 
of the family in preparing to extend 
the family unit into another generati-
on, for marriage in the system was not 
officially perceived as an emotional at-
tachment between individuals [b]ut as 
an economic and social contract bet-
ween two family groups, a contract that 
was to benefit both. Although marria-
ge was a crucial step in tying individual 
members to the group, it was the birth 
of children that conferred full adult sta-
tus on both the man and the woman. 
Only after the birth of children were the 
newly married man and women consi-
dered full members of their particular 
family unit and adult members of the 
wider society (Warnock Fernea 5).
In agrarian societies, youth as period thus 
hardly existed.1 Children were incorpo-
rated into the labour regime of extended 
families and local communities and only 
after marriage achieved the status of 
being adult, though they only became a 
full member of society after children were 
born. This requirement can be compre-
hended as a necessity of social reproduc-
tion, but also as a condition to achieve 
social security: Children were expected to 
assist parents throughout their lives, as no 
other institutions or systems of welfare 
offered an alternative source of security. 
Indeed, even today the disposable male 
labour reservoir largely determines the 
livelihood security of nomadic families 
(Gertel and Breuer). With the ongoing 
transformation of agrarian societies, pro-
found changes through the monetariza-
tion of labour relations, rapid urbanization, 
public education and lately driven by the 
expansion of wireless communication 
opened up spaces for the formation of 
youth as a social group. Warnock Fernea 
continues her argument and further 
quotes Mohammed Soufani from the 
Ministry of Education in Morocco, who 
emphasises still in 1988 that children are 
situated between two worlds: “that of their 
illiterate, unambitious, resigned parents 
and of their ‘modern’ educated, highly 
aspiring peers.” He continuous: 
At a time when old absolutes are crum-
bling and old values are disregarded, 
what are young people to do? They are 
endangered because they are, in terms 
of values at least, at sea (Mohammed 
Soufani in Warnock Fernea 4). 
To comprehend the massive ruptures that 
are fragmenting Arab societies and con-
tribute to the formation of youth as a social 
category, a closer look into economic 
developments is helpful.
The initiative of James Côté (527) for a 
renewed understanding of youth from a 
political economy perspective recently 
opened up a contested debate about the 
relations between the situation of young 
people and the dynamics of the wider 
economy. Based on the observation of a 
(systematic) ‘proletarization’ of youth, 
Côté demands identifying the root causes 
for this development. He assumes that the 
deterioration in material conditions is 
linked to the global economic depression, 
representing one of the most severe crises 
of capitalism, expressed, for example, in 
unemployment, social exclusion and seri-
ous wealth inequalities. Subsequently, he 
asks to further inquire into how far neolib-
eralism impacts on the prolongation of 
youth and thus contributes to the dimin-
ished economic prospects of young peo-
ple. Sukarieh and Tannock (1), referring to 
Côté and his critics (e.g. France and 
Treadgold 612), argue for realigning youth 
studies in order to capture a wider social 
field. This corresponds to the various stud-
ies undertaken to comprehend social 
insecurity in the first place. One strand of 
research, originating from studying mar-
ginalization, poverty, and vulnerability in 
the global south, is largely linked and con-
nected to development discourse. 
Another, second strand, addressing the 
impact of neoliberalism in dismantling 
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welfare states in Europe and elsewhere, 
is connected to the inquiry into changing 
conditions of labour and increasing preca-
risation. In the aftermath of the financial 
crisis of 2007/08, the two fields experi-
enced a conversion and also a joint 
interest in studying and comprehending 
the role of young people (Gertel 
“Ungewiss heit” 39).
Global South: Expanding 
Although the development discourse was 
able to highlight historical causes of 
inequality, scrutinize the impact of the new 
international division of labour in the 
1970s, analyse the consequences of the 
debt crisis for Arab economies in the 
1980s, and also tackle the social conse-
quences of structural adjustment mea-
sures, youth were almost never identified 
as a target group. Youth as a social group 
only appeared on the social surface in 
struggles for political independence, as 
an anticolonial revolutionary generation. 
But increasing poverty, combined with 
severe cuts in public subsidy systems, 
caused recurrent IMF or bread riots and 
widespread insecurity (Walton and 
Seddon). An increasing ‘strata of the inse-
cure’ (Elwert et al. 284) emerged, particu-
larly among the growing masses of city 
dwellers. Semsek offers an implicit posi-
tioning of youth when he describes a 
potential successful ‘modern’ agent in 
urban Cairo:
The individual becomes a free-floating 
agent, acting daily, in different spheres, 
with different keys of action. To achie-
ve prosperity people have to be suc-
cessful on all occasions. [A]n individual 
who tries to integrate all such different 
ways of being into one frame of action 
has not understood that modernity de-
mands a lot, not least a multiplicity of 
human actions (Semsek 283). 
Bennani-Chraibi captures related identity 
constructions for Moroccan youth as ‘bri-
colage culturelle’ (102). It is from here, 
from the multiplicity of lifestyles and the 
contestation of traditional role models, 
that student protests in Arab countries and 
youth subcultures developed, rendering 
youth newly visible in society. Bayat (115) 
comprehends this as the ‘claim of youth-
fulness’, cumulating in the so-called Arab 
Spring when young people initiated mass 
protests (Gertel and Ouaissa). 
Two trajectories are crucial: On the one 
hand, ‘youth’ emerged as a social category 
in the Arab world only recently. From the 
very beginning, though, different groups 
and various subcultures developed, struc-
tured by gender, age and confessional 
lines, but also subdivided by interests in 
music, sport and clothing styles, consump-
tion patterns and political provenience 
(Herrera and Bayat). This development has 
been compounded by rapidly spreading 
communication technologies starting in 
the 1990s, such as the introduction of 
SAT-TV, mobile phones, Internet infrastruc-
ture and smart phones. Alternative life-
styles became visible and lived distinc-
tions between Arab youth, as a social 
category beyond the family, and local 
communities became possible. On the 
other hand insecurities – economic, politi-
cal and cultural – expanded, while coping 
strategies to buffer transformations and 
insecurities were not able to follow the 
pace and depth of changes. Whereas their 
parents, particularly men, had been able 
to enter into secure labour conditions in 
still-existing Arab welfare states until the 
mid 1980s, young people – the newly 
forming youth – grew up in neoliberal 
times, experiencing both insecurity for 
their own life trajectories and dependency 
on their families. 
It is from this disjuncture where the argu-
ment of ‘waithood’ unfolds. Marriage has 
become increasingly costly, not only for 
young people and their families; its eco-
nomic scope has stretched beyond kin 
networks and impacted on national econ-
omies. In Egypt, for example, its total eco-
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nomic significance exceeds the amount of 
economic aid, of all foreign remittances, 
and almost equalled total tourist revenues 
in 1999 (Singerman 11). Practices of mar-
riage are thus thoroughly embedded in 
society and not easy to change. Young 
people and their families have to save 
money for years in order to be able to 
accumulate the capital needed to marry 
and start a family. Ten years ago Singerman 
emphasized the consequences:
Throughout the Middle East, the family 
not only financially supports the child-
ren until they marry, but it also super-
vises community norms and morality. 
Families are intimately and extensively 
involved in nearly all realms of social, 
political, moral, and economic life such 
as educating children, childrearing, se-
curing employment, negotiating the 
bureaucracy and engaging with the 
political elite, establishing and main-
taining businesses, saving money, pro-
moting morality and status, distributing 
resources and information, securing 
credit, organizing migration, and poli-
cing sexuality (Singerman 36). 
This all comes together as a “family ethos” 
that while creating security for young peo-
ple in the midst of expanding uncertainty 
is “supporting the status quo” (Singerman, 
37). From here my critique starts, challeng-
ing this notion of a fixed reality of a con-
serving status quo. 
Over the last decade insecurity has largely 
expanded in the Middle East and North 
Africa, particularly after the Arab Spring. 
Not only do armed conflicts dominate 
everyday life in Libya, Yemen, and Syria 
today, but for many other countries the 
situation is also extremely problematic. 
Millions of refugees live in Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Turkey; revenues from tour-
ism, an important pillar of national econo-
mies, have collapsed in Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Jordan, while at the same time invest-
ments are declining, with few exceptions, 
due to political instability. Accordingly, the 
latest Arab Human Development Report 
states that the Human Development 
Index—a measure of a country’s level of 
development—has fallen substantially 
since 2010, and inequality in Arab coun-
tries has increased (AHDR, 1.2). This is not 
to say that these problems are generated 
exclusively internally. Given the colonial 
past, asymmetric exchange systems, and 
extensive deregulation and privatization, 
together with the expanding impact of the 
international financial system, external 
and internal causes of inequality are highly 
articulated on a global scale. Young peo-
ple live in the midst of the turmoil of a fur-
ther polarizing world.
Global North: Shrinking 
Changes are also occurring north of the 
Mediterranean. Based on Robert Castel’s 
observation of expanding social insecurity 
in Europe and on Klaus Dörres’ insights on 
the working society, the debate on precar-
ity and a renewed social question took off, 
particularly after the financial crisis. As a 
consequence of neoliberal restructuring, 
dissolving welfare states, flexibilization of 
labour regulations, and increasing insecu-
rities, disparities have expanded. 
According to Castel & Dörre, precarity 
shows four features: (a) In cases when 
employees or workers fall below a (local) 
common standard of income, of protec-
tion or of social integration, they are con-
sidered to live in precarity. (b) The subjec-
tive dimension of precarious labour entails 
the loss of making sense, deficits in appre-
ciation, and uncertainties in planning 
ahead. (c) Precarity is thus comprehended 
as a relational category, depending on the 
social delineation for common standards. 
(d) Subsequently, the precariat is not a 
homogeneous class. Resulting from the 
erosion of common standards, different 
societal zones of integration, precarity and 
decoupling emerge. Marchart extends the 
argument and stresses that precarity—in all 
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its different forms—has already expanded 
into general society, transgressing the 
field of labour relations, shaping as well 
the spheres of reproduction, generating 
fear, and constituting a society of precarity. 
North-South differences, as a conse-
quence, have further been blurred.
Particularly young people in Mediterranean 
countries, such as Italy, Spain, Greece and 
Portugal, have more recently been hit by 
expanding insecurities such as youth 
unemployment (Bush et al.). Transitions 
from school into higher education and 
vocational training, and also from higher 
education into the labour market, became 
increasingly problematic; even for young 
people with university degrees easy tran-
sitions are no longer a given. Limited 
labour contracts, part-time employment, 
contracted and temporary work, and pre-
carious self-employment contribute to a 
prolongation of adolescence far into 
adulthood. While European youth do 
comply with the requirements for social 
upward mobility (education, flexibility, 
work experience), the official promises of 
accessing formal, stable and well-paid 
jobs and being integrated into society are 
no longer fulfilled everywhere (e.g. for 
Greece, see Grekopoulou; and for 
Portugal, see the protest song of Deolinda). 
These uncertainties in an increasingly frag-
mented world have to be navigated by 
young people, but what about their inter-
nal insecurities? 
Youth, including German youth, live in a 
liminal world, as the huge corpus of litera-
ture reveals (cf. Mansel and Brinkhoff; 
Flammer and Alsaker; Albert et al.). 
Physical and psychical processes of 
restructuring urge young people to disen-
tangle the bonds of family dependencies 
and to detach and free themselves from 
the ‘embodied parents’ (Schröder & 
Leonhardt). Becoming a member of the 
world of adults and thus of society requires 
an adolescent to re-evaluate emotional 
and social ties, to break with unwelcome 
parental determination, and to appropri-
ate self-experienced and adjusted sets of 
values. The simultaneous desires for rec-
ognition and appreciation on the one 
hand and for autonomy and individuation 
on the other conjoin in the longing to be 
accepted as a responsible person that, 
however, still needs space to develop. 
Adolescence is thus marked by the con-
currence of different aspirations: biologi-
cal, cultural and occupational identity frag-
ments develop and mutually constitute 
the subject. This is not a linear process; 
progressive ambitions are rather often 
accompanied by regressive tendencies. 
To sum up: Uncertainties and insecurities 
of young people conjoin and interfere 
with each other, both in the Arab world as 
well as in Europe (cf. Albert and Gertel, 
357). What does this encounter entail for 
the respective societies and different 
groups of young people? Every society 
with an interest in renewal and regenera-
tion should create conditions to allow the 
questioning of its norms and of estab-
lished thinking and should develop the 
capacity to empower the creativity and 
innovation that is released during adoles-
cence. This idea comes, of course, not 
uncontested, as it threatens authorities, 
and it is realized only to certain degrees 
and in specific times. The European youth 
of the 1920s and 1960s are, for example, 
valued as a development model that has 
to be protected by society (Schröder & 
Leonhardt). In these periods, youth have 
been recognized as strategic social 
groups oriented towards education and 
experimenting with new lifestyles and new 
ways of thinking. 
Contained Youth
The majority of Arab countries are recently 
shaped by a loss of employment security, 
expanding precarity and a failed promise 
of education enabling social mobility. 
With few suitable jobs for qualified young 
people and limited mobility opportunities, 
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the juvenile phase is, as a consequence, 
extended for many as they lack the neces-
sary resources to start a family. Young 
adults can hardly liberate themselves from 
the bonds of their families to become 
emotionally and financially independent, 
which increases the potential for individ-
ual frustration and forms new collective 
moralities. A longitudinal study in Rabat 
(Gertel, “Jugend(t)räume und Alltag“, 26) 
juxtaposes the situation of about 400 
young people in 2002 and in 2012; it com-
pares the importance of family support 
and current anxieties among young 
unmarried people (aged 15-34 years) one 
year after 9/11 and one year after the 
events of 2011 (Arab Spring). Two findings 
are crucial: Firstly, although the general 
self-assessment of the economic situation 
increased considerably during these ten 
years, the most frequent fear of young 
people, namely that of “being not as suc-
cessful as one wish” also increased. The 
pressure of being successful under any 
circumstances is deeply felt. Secondly, the 
largest increase of fears was “to break with 
the parents”. Hence, parents and kin rela-
tions offer support to an extent that the 
role of the family can hardly be called into 
question. A more recent study from 
2016/17 of 9,000 young people (aged 
16-30 years) capturing nine Arab countries 
reveals that the majority, more than two-
thirds, would indeed raise their children 
‘about the same’ or even ‘in exactly the 
same way’ as their parents raised them 
(Gertel and Kreuer, 80). Young people in 
the Global South are increasingly becom-
ing a contained youth, a group that has to 
cope with the bifurcation of increasing 
economic and political insecurities pre-
venting long-term life plans on the one 
hand, and of growing dependencies that 
are entangled with moral standards of for-
mer generations. These have often been 
not developed to handle the demands 
and norms of modernity. They rather con-
tinue to unfold as a series of almost unin-
terrupted valued interventions into the 
everyday lives of young people who are 
simultaneously exposed to accelerating 
exchange relations, expanding consumer-
ism, and omnipresent visual images of 
alleged needs. Both are shaping personal 
imaginations, aspirations, expectations 
and encounters – entailing, at times, dra-
matic potentials of severe collisions.
What follows
One of the foundational questions in 
youth studies still remains whether the cat-
egory of ‘youth’ represents a group by 
itself, with shared or unifying properties, 
or rather in how far it constitutes a catch-all 
category, containing different and varying 
subgroups, depending, for example, on 
age, marital status, income and peer 
group. For the group of contained youth 
this question has to be extended: A con-
tained youth does not exist by itself. It is 
best comprehended in relation to parents, 
as they mutually depend on each other. 
The family constitutes the unit of repro-
duction that decides about female and 
male obligations, options, careers, and 
perspectives. This holds true for identity 
formation, educational careers, the entry 
into labour markets and marriage options. 
As a consequence, adolescents should be 
addressed together with their family as a 
unit of analysis in post-Arab-Spring youth 
studies.
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Notes
1 This is not to say that we 
should assume a stable 
secure past of youth in 
the Arab world, living in 
homogeneous agrarian 
societies with functioning and 
uncontested social structures. 
Rather, socio-economic 
differences, including a 
variety of political conflicts, 
also prevailed in Arab 
countries throughout the last 
century.
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